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MORE ON ADVERSE POSSESSION: A
REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR
HELMHOLZ
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM*
In 1983 the Washington University Law Quarterly published an article
by Professor R.H. Helmholz' in which he came to the following
conclusions:
(1) the accrual of a cause of action against the adverse claimant and
in favor of the true owner is irrelevant in adverse possession cases;
2
(2) in determining whether an adverse claimant has satisfied the
"claim of right" requirement "the bulk of the recent cases requires... [a]
formulation of the [adverse possession] rule [that recognizes] the rele-
vance of the subjective intent of the possessor in determining whether or
not he may validly acquire title by the passage of the statutory period" of
limitation;3
(3) although the cases "do not show that the adverse possessor must
plead and prove that he [actually] acted in good faith,"4 the judges "have
treated the possessor's actual belief that the property belonged to him as
a positive and relevant factor"; 5 and
(4) [w]here the possessor knows that he is trespassing, valid title does
not accrue to him simply by the passage of years" 6 because the courts feel
"that it is wrong to allow someone who has acted in bad faith to profit
thereby." 7
I read Professor Helmholz's 1983 article with interest and was initially
inclined to accept his conclusions at face value. Later, however, I began
to have doubts, and I therefore undertook to read all the cases cited by
Professor Helmholz in support of his principal arguments. My reading
of these cases persuaded me that, by and large, they do not support Pro-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan, S.B. 1942, J.D. 1948, Harvard University.
1. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WAsH. U.L.Q. 331 (1983).
2. Id. at 334-36.
3. Id. at 332.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 338-39.
6. Id. at 347.
7. Id.
1167
Washington University Open Scholarship
1168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:1167
fessor Helmholz's conclusions, especially his conclusion that the courts,
on moral or ethical grounds, "regularly prefer the claims of an honest
man over those of a dishonest man,"8 treating "good faith" as a signifi-
cant positive factor and "bad faith" as a disqualifying factor in adverse
possession cases.9 My reply to Professor Helmholz's initial article, criti-
cizing his conclusions therein, was recently published in the Washington
University Law Quarterly,'0 together with an extended response by Pro-
fessor Helmholz. 11 In this rejoinder, I propose to deal briefly with some
of the issues raised by Professor Helmholz's response.
I. THE CASES SURVEYED BY PROFESSOR HELMHOLZ
A. The Alleged "Over-abundance" of Adverse Possession Cases
During the Survey Period
Professor Helmholz began his initial article by stating that "[t]he rele-
vant [adverse possession] cases are abundant," indeed "over-abun-
dant," 12 hence, he said, he decided to look carefully at these "relevant"
adverse possession cases to determine whether they resulted from "un-
certainty in the law and consequent litigation" generated by judicial ad-
herence to an "ethically based notion" that "there is something wrong in
permitting a knowing trespasser to gain good title."' 3 Because his article
disclosed that there were only about one hundred relevant adverse pos-
session cases, I thought it was fair to ask whether that many cases, de-
cided by appellate courts in all fifty state jurisdictions over an eighteen-
year period, could accurately be termed "over-abundant." I tentatively
concluded that the answer was "no." I am now firmly persuaded by Pro-
fessor Helmholz's illustrative statistics on appellate cases decided in
Michigan and Texas in 198414 that the answer is "no." I would not char-
acterize the one hundred or so relevant adverse possession cases decided
during the 1966-1983 period as over-abundant in comparison to the total
of 9,100 cases decided by Michigan's appellate courts in 1984 and the
8. Id. at 358.
9. Id. at 357.
10. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64
WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Reply].
11. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 65 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Response].
12. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 333.
13. Id.
14. Response, supra note 11, at 101.
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9,043 cases decided by the Texas appellate courts in 1983.15
B. Professor Helmholz's Reliance on Intermediate Appellate Court
Opinions
In his Response, 6 Professor Helmholz vigorously took me to task for
noting briefly, at the beginning of my Reply, 7 that almost half the cases
he cited in his original article as direct support for his conclusions were
decided by intermediate courts and thus have only limited significance as
precedents, and for noting that the opinions of many intermediate court
panels should be viewed with some skepticism in light of the varying
quality of these panels.' 8 I did not, however, say that one should "pay no
attention" to the opinions of intermediate appellate courts and, in fact,
gave careful attention to such opinions throughout the main body of my
Reply. Nevertheless, my brief comment with respect to the large number
of intermediate appellate court opinions relied on by Professor Helmholz
elicited almost three pages of justification in his Response. 9 One of Pro-
fessor Helmholz's main arguments is that only a minority of the cases
decided by intermediate appellate courts are reviewed by higher courts,
so that "the intermediate courts are the courts of last resort for the great
majority of cases." 20 There is some force in this argument. But I sup-
pose Professor Helmholz would concede that, if intermediate appellate
courts are really misconstruing or ignoring settled legal rules established
by courts of last resort, the latter probably will exercise their discretion-
ary review power to correct the errors of the intermediate courts.2" In-
deed, a quick survey of the Texas Supreme Court and Texas Court of
Appeals cases decided during 198522 reveals that, out of a total of 133
15. Id. Professor Helmholz did not distinguish the total numbers of cases from the cases dis-
posed of with written opinions. Only the latter are significant in assessing trends in the law. From
1966 through 1983, the Michigan Supreme Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals handed down
only 34,458 opinions in civil cases. See 1966-1983 MICH. OFF. ST. Cr. AD. REP. But even 34,458
opinions in the 1966-1983 period dwarfs the 100 or so relevant adverse possession opinions from all
jurisdictions included in Professor Helmholz's survey.
16. Response, supra note 11, at 99-102.
17. Reply, supra note 10, at 2.
18. Id. at 2 n.6.
19. Response, supra note 11, at 99-102.
20. Id. at 101.
21. E.g., the erroneous holding, in Hansen v. National Bank of Albany Park, 59 Ill. App. 3d
877, 879, 365 N.E.2d 363, 367 (1978), that bad faith possession is not under claim of right was
quickly corrected in Joiner v. Janssen, 85 Ill. 2d 74, 80, 421 N.E.2d 170, 173 (1981).
22. This survey was made by checking the tables of Texas appellate opinions reported in the
appropriate volumes of West's Southwest (Second) Reporter. The present Texas Court of Appeals
Number 4] 1169
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decisions of the supreme court that reviewed decisions of the court of
appeals in civil cases, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals in
eighty-seven cases, modified the court of appeals' decisions in two in-
stances, and affirmed in only forty-four instances. The batting average of
the courts of appeals (about .330) would be excellent for a baseball
player, but is not very good for an intermediate appellate court.23
II. THE RELEVANCE OF ACCRUAL OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
I devoted a substantial part of my Reply to an argument that the "posi-
tive requirements of adverse possession," stated in some form in almost
every appellate opinion dealing with adverse possession, are primarily
judicial criteria for determining whether an adverse claimant's conduct
was such as to give the true owner, throughout the statutory limitation
period, a cause of action for recovery of possession of his land.24 I did so
because Professor Helmholz asserted in his original article that, with one
exception, the accrual of a cause of action in ejectment is irrelevant. 25
Professor Helmholz's main support for this statement was his observa-
tion that "recent cases on adverse possession seldom approach the sub-
ject by asking when a cause of action accrued against the possessor. '26
He further asserted that to approach some recent cases "by asking about
the availability of ejectment [against the possessor] is to invite laugh-
ter."27 In his Response, however, he explained that he did not really
mean that "the moment the statute starts to run is literally without sig-
was called the Texas Court of Civil Appeals prior to September 1, 1981. The court of appeals has
jurisdiction over criminal as well as civil appeals, unlike its predecessor. In making my survey of
1985 appellate opinions, I counted only appeals in civil cases.
23. An additional point: Professor Helmholz seems to find fault with my Reply for not criticiz-
ing his "weighing intermediate [appellate] court opinions equally, not with those of the supreme
courts, but with those of the trial courts," asserting that I "obviously could have thought of this
criticism" and that failure to do so "is one indication (that I am] less interested in the realities of the
law of adverse possession than in upholding the theoretically 'correct' rule." Response, supra note
11, at 101-02. I want to assure Professor Helmholz that I did consider saying something about the
desirability of surveying the results reached by trial courts in adverse possession cases if some feasi-
ble way to do so could be worked out. But I decided against saying anything on that score because I
thought it would be unfair to criticize Professor Helmholz for not undertaking a well-nigh impossi-
ble task that I myself would not be willing to attempt.
24. Reply, supra note 10, at 3-5.
25. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 334-335. The only exception, according to Professor Helmholz,
is in "cases involving future interests, disabilities, and, to a lesser extent, cotenancies." Id. at 335.
26. Id. at 334.
27. Id. at 335.
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nificance,"28 as indeed he was surely compelled to do by those cases
where the duration of the adverse claimant's possession is the crucial
isue. I shall not repeat here the reasons for my belief that the primary
function of the positive requirements of adverse possession is to assure
that an adverse claimant's conduct was such as to give the true owner a
continuing cause of action for recovery of possession.29 But I am puzzled
by Professor Helmholz's criticism of this belief on the ground that it is
inconsistent with the views expressed in the American Law of Property,30
for I did not purport to espouse those views in my Reply. I remain con-
vinced that a wrongful possession sufficient to create a cause of action for
recovery of possession continuing for the full statutory limitation period
can be accurately defined by reference to the positive elements of adverse
possession set out in the cases. And I remain unconvinced that reference
to those positive elements shows that the courts no longer distinguish
between adverse possession and prescription.31
The only positive requirement of adverse possession that causes any
real difficulty is the requirement that an adverse claimant's possession
must be under "claim of right" and-to the extent that "claim of right"
is subsumed therein-the requirement that the claimant's possession
must be "hostile. '32
28. Response, supra note 11, at 78.
29. See Reply, supra note 10, at 9-16.
30. Response, supra note 11, at 77-78. Indeed, I would have expected commendation rather
than criticism, because Professor Helmholz is very critical of the treatment of adverse possession in
the American Law of Property.
31. See discussion of the distinction between adverse possession and prescription in Reply,
supra note 10, at 6-8. In his original article, Professor Helmholz said that the distinction has been
blurred in some states by "prescriptive title statutes, which define the means of acquiring title by
adverse possession" and "typically spell out the five affirmative requirements for prescriptive title,
restating the required length of possession found in that statute of limitations." Helmholz, supra note
1, at 334-35. This is quite inaccurate. Professor Helmholz apparently refers to the statutes derived
from the New York Revised Statutes of 1828, which define "possession" for purposes of adverse
possession, see e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW §§ 512-522 (Consol. 1981), and also require that
the possession be "under claim of title, exclusive of any other right." See, ag., N.Y. REAL PROP.
AcTs. LAW §§ 511, 521 (Consol. 1981). But none of these statutes purports to vest title in the
adverse claimant when the former owner's right to recover possession is barred, and only one uses
the term "prescription" or "prescriptive title." Although a few American statutes do provide ex-
pressly for vesting of title in the adverse claimant at the end of the limitation period-see Reply,
supra note 10, at 5 n. 11-only the Georgia statute mentions the affirmative requirements of adverse
possession, and only the Oklahoma statute uses the term "prescriptive title." All of the title-vesting
statutes make it clear that the title vested in the adverse possessor is based on the barring of the
former owner's right to recover possession by the expiration of the limitation period.
32. The minimal meaning of hostile is wrongful, because none of the other affirmative require-
ments of adverse possession can be construed to mean wrongful.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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III. CLAIM OF RIGHT AND SUBJECTIVE INTENT
At several points in his Response, Professor Helmholz erroneously as-
serted that I adhere to the "pure possession" theory of adverse possession
set forth in the American Law of Property. In my Reply to his original
article, I clearly stated that, by the latter part of the nineteenth century,
most American courts had adopted the claim of right requirement,3 3 and
I recognized that this permitted judicial consideration of an adverse
claimant's "subjective intent."34 But I noted that "the 'claim of right'
requirement has little practical significance in ordinary adverse posses-
sion cases [because] those 'acts of ownership' required to establish the
adverse claimant's 'actual, open, notorious, hostile, and exclusive' posses-
sion... will also be sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption that the
adverse claimant has a 'claim of right.' ,31 I am perplexed by Professor
Helmholz's criticism of the quoted statement, for I cited ample authority
to support it,36 and Professor Helmholz conceded in his original article
that "[i]n a great many adverse possession cases, there is simply no [di-
rect] evidence of the possessor's intent."37
In his Response Professor Helmholz also criticized my statement about
the limited significance of the claim of right requirement on the ground
that it is inconsistent with my later statement that the number of adverse
possession cases decided in the 1966-1983 period, "is the result of the
continuing confusion of the courts as to the meaning of the 'claim of
right' requirement."3 But he failed to note that I also stated in my
Reply:
[t]he substantial amount of adverse possession litigation in recent years may
also reflect the fact that it is often difficult to determine ... whether the
adverse claimant's acts amounted to 'actual possession' or only to a series of
separate trespasses; whether the claimant's possession was 'permissive' and
therefore not 'adverse' at its inception and, if so, whether the claimant's
later conduct converted [his] possession into an 'adverse' possession; and
whether the claimant's conduct subsequently converted a possession that
was prima facie 'adverse' . . . into a 'permissive' possession.
39
If I were to rewrite the conclusion to my Response today, I would
33. Reply, supra note 10, at 16-17.
34. Id. at 22.
35. Id. at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at nn.58-62.
37. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 357.
38. Response, supra note 11, at 79 (quoting Reply, supra note 10, at 59).
39. Reply, supra note 10, at 61 (footnotes omitted).
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place more emphasis on the latter difficulties, but I still think that contin-
uing confusion as to the meaning of claim of right has characterized
American adverse possession cases since the claim of right requirement
was generally adopted in the second half of the nineteenth century.'
Such confusion is clearly the basis of the conflicting and confused opin-
ions as to the effect of an "honest mistake" in cases involving boundary
disputes between adjoining landowners.4 1
Professor Helmholz further criticized my treatment of the claim of
right requirement on the ground that I have confused the prescriptive
with the descriptive and have therefore been "unwilling to look at what
terms like 'claim of right' have meant in the actual case law."42 This is a
serious criticism that requires us to take another look at the cases cited
by Professor Helmholz to support his conclusions with respect to claim
of right and subjective intent, which he thinks is primarily a question of
good faith or bad faith on the part of the adverse claimant.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF GOOD FAITH AND BAD FAITH
With respect to the relevance of an adverse claimant's good faith or
bad faith, I believe that most American courts adhere to the position
adopted by the highest court of New York in Humbert v. Trinity
Church 43 -that the required claim of title may exist whether the adverse
claimant acted in good faith or in bad faith, because what is required is
"the intent to claim at all, right or wrong, with or without knowledge
that another had title."'  But the terms good faith and bad faith require
40. I agree, of course, with Professor Helmholz's statement that the cases he cited in his origi-
nal article "sometimes involve both objective questions of the sufficiency of physical occupation and
subjective questions of the occupant's state of mind." Response, supra note 11, at 73. But there are
actually very few cases of that sort. One good example is Miller v. Fitzpatrick, discussed infra text
accompanying notes 59-64. Unfortunately, however, Professor Helmholz got the result of that case
reversed in his original article and then, in his Response, when attempting to correct his error, he
compounded the error by stating that "the ultimate holding of the case had nothing to do with the
problem of subjective intent." Response, supra note 11, at 85. As the discussion infra text accompa-
nying notes 59-64 indicates, this is also quite erroneous.
41. A good example of this confusion is Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N.Y. 95, 106 N.E.2d 28,
reh'g denied, 304 N.Y. 590, 107 N.E.2d 82 (1952) (discussed in Reply, supra note 10, at 60-61). For
an older example of judicial confusion see Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me. 575, 584 (1863), where the court
said: "Mere occupation, by inadvertence, or mistake, without any intention to claim title, may not be
a disseizin; as where a fence is erroneously erected not on the dividing line. But if, in such case, there
is an intention to claim title to the land occupied, though the line is fixed by mistake, it is a disseizin."
42. Response, supra note 11, at 80.
43. 24 Wend. 587 (N.Y. 1840).
44. Id. at 611.
Number 4] 1173
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definition. For the purposes of this Rejoinder, I will accept the defini-
tions set out in Professor Helmholz's Response-" 'good faith' means
that the claimant believed that the land belonged to him. 'Bad faith'
means the opposite"a-although I think these definitions conceal impor-
tant distinctions. 6
A. Good Faith Possession
Leaving aside cases where an adverse claimant seeks the benefit of a
shorter statutory limitation period or of the "constructive possession"
doctrine,47 the first group of cases cited by Professor Helmholz in sup-
port of his conclusion that good faith is a positive factor in adverse pos-
session consists of cases where courts have recently applied the
Connecticut "mistaken boundary" rule-cases where one landowner
claims to have acquired title to land beyond his "paper boundary" be-
cause he possessed it for the statutory period in the honest but mistaken
belief that he owned the land.48 These cases reject the Maine rule, which
denies that possession taken and held in the honest but mistaken belief
that the disputed land belongs to the adverse claimant can be deemed to
be hostile and under claim of right precisely because of the claimant's
good faith.4 9 But, as I noted in my Reply, nothing in any of the cases
adopting Connecticut rule suggests that an adverse claimant acting in
good faith is deemed to stand higher in the eye of the law than an adverse
claimant who knows that he does not own the disputed strip and intends
to maintain his wrongful possession as long as possible.50 Indeed, all the
cases adopting or applying the Connecticut rule assume that possession
by an adverse claimant of the latter type is under claim of right and
therefore adverse to the true owner; these cases simply hold that the req-
uisite claim of right also exists when the possession is held in good faith
45. Response, supra note 11, at 69.
46. The definition of bad faith, for example, does not distinguish between one who has the
intent to acquire title by adverse possession to land he possesses but knows he does not own and one
who, without any intent to acquire title by adverse possession, possesses land he knows he does not
own; and it also fails to characterize a possessor who, unsure whether he owns a disputed tract of
land, intends to maintain his possession as long as possible, whether it is lawful or unlawful.
47. See discussion of these cases in Helmholz, supra note 1, at 337; Reply, supra note 10, at 23-
25.
48. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 339-41.
49. Both the Connecticut rule and the Maine rule can be traced back to the early or middle part
of the nineteenth century. The Connecticut rule originated in French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439 (1831);
the Maine rule goes back at least to Lincoln v. Edgecomb, 31 Me. 345 (1850).
50. Reply, supra note 10, at 28-29.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/5
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pursuant to an honest but mistaken belief that the disputed strip belongs
to the adverse claimant.51 This was made very clear in the original Con-
necticut case, French v. Pearce,52 from which the appellation "Connecti-
cut rule" is derived, and it is made equally clear in the leading recent case
of Mannillo v. Gorski,53 on which Professor Helmholz mainly relied for
his conclusion that good faith is a plus factor in adverse possession cases.
In addition, French, Mannillo, and the many other cases following the
Connecticut rule not only recognize that both good faith and bad faith
are consistent with a claim of right, but also adopt an objective theory of
adverse possession in holding that the subjective intent of an adverse
claimant is irrelevant in boundary-mistake cases.
On the other hand, in the many jurisdictions that still adhere to the
Maine rule, possession of a strip of land beyond the possessor's paper
boundary is not deemed to be under claim of right and is thus not ad-
verse unless the possessor's intent is "to claim title to all land within a
certain boundary on the face of the earth, whether it shall eventually be
found to be the correct one or not."54 The Maine rule is thus based on
the subjective-intent theory championed by Professor Helmholz, but it
actually rewards the adverse claimant who either knows that his posses-
sion extends beyond his true boundary or does not care whether his pos-
session is, in fact, wrongful. In both cases, I would describe him as
holding in bad faith. The reader is left to wonder why Professor Helm-
holz did not acknowledge that the Connecticut rule cases are inconsistent
with his views about both bad faith and subjective intent, while the
Maine rule cases, though inconsistent with his views on either good faith
or bad faith, are perfectly consistent with his views about subjective
intent.
Professor Helmholz's original article cited cases other than mistaken-
51. Id. at 26-29.
52. 8 Conn. 439 (1831).
53. 54 N.J. 378, 386, 255 A.2d 258, 262 (1969), where the court said:
Whether or not the entry is caused by mistake or intent, the same result eventuates-the
true owner is ousted from possession.... Accordingly we discard the requirement that the
entry and continued possession must be accompanied by a knowing intentional hostility
and hold that any entry and possession for the required time which is exclusive, continu-
ous, uninterrupted, visible and notorious, even though under mistaken claim of title, is
sufficient to support a claim of title by adverse possession.
54. Preble v. Maine Cent. R.R., 85 Me. 260, 265, 27 A. 149, 150 (1893). The court explained
further that "in case of occupancy by mistake beyond a line capable of being ascertained, this inten-
tion to claim title... must appear to be absolute and not conditional; otherwise the possession will
not be deemed adverse to the true owner." Id.
Number 4] 1175
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boundary cases where, he asserted, "despite the absence of any neces-
sity," courts noted the "existence and the relevance of good faith."55 In
some of these cases, however, the courts were simply concerned with
making it clear that hostility is "a term of art and does not imply ill
will," or that "[flor possession to be hostile.., no spirit of animosity or
hostility is required,56 or that (in Professor Helmholz's words) "[t]he
hostility requirement is consistent with belief on the part of the adverse
possession that the title is rightfully his." 7 It is clear that these cases do
not support Professor Helmholz's argument that good faith is a positive
factor in adverse possessor; they merely show that either good faith or
bad faith may be consistent with a claim of right.
Most of the other cited cases also fail to support Professor Helmholz's
argument,5" although some contain language that, taken out of context,
may appear to do so. In my Reply, I noted Miller v. Fitzpatrick,59 Butler
v. Hanson,60 and Reeves v. Metropolitan Trust Co. 1 as cases where Pro-
fessor Helmholz's quotation of short snippets from the opinions seemed
to me to be seriously misleading. In his Response, Professor Helmholz
admits that there was error in his use of Miller, since the court actually
held against the adverse claimant, but he seems to derive some comfort
from an assertion that "the ultimate holding of the case had nothing to
do with the problem of subjective intent"62 because the court held that
acts like "the mowing of lawn, [and] cutting of weeds . . . evidence a
casual and incomplete use of the premises" and "hence were insufficient
to constitute [the] 'actual' possession that would give sufficient notice of
an adverse claim to the record owner."63 Perhaps I should simply accept
Professor Helmholz's admission of error as to the Miller holding, but I
am again bothered by his having quoted in his Response only a snippet
from the passage in which the court stated its ratio decidendi. When this
passage is read in its entirety," it becomes clear that the court based its
decision on both the absence of evidence of the adverse claimant's subjec-
55. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 337.
56. Id at 337 (at text accompanying nn.24, 25).
57. Id (at text accompanying n.25.).
58. See Reply, supra note 10, at 29. n.101.
59. 418 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), quoted in Helmholz, supra note 1, at 341.
60. 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), quoted in Helmholz, supra note 1, at 341.
61. 254 Ark. 1002, 498 S.W.2d 2 (1973), quoted in Helmholz, supra note 1, at 338,
62. Response, supra note 11, at 85.
63. Id.
64. 418 S.W.2d at 888-90.
[Vol. 64:1167
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tive intent to hold any of the true owner's land adversely to him and on
the insufficiency of the adverse claimant's conduct to establish an actual,
open and notorious possession. And the primary reason for concluding
that the adverse claimant lacked hostile intent was that it was shown that
he honestly believed that the disputed land belonged to him. The subjec-
tive intent required by the Miller court as a basis for acquisition of title by
adverse possession was actually a bad faith intent to acquire what the
claimant knew did not belong to him. Thus Miller v. Fitzpatrick not only
fails to provide support for Professor Helmholz's argument as to the rele-
vance of good faith but actually supports an argument that good faith may
prevent the adverse claimant from acquiring title by adverse possession.
A careful reading of Butler v. Hansen65 indicates that the principal
issue on appeal was whether there was at least some evidence of adverse
possession to support the jury's verdict in favor of the adverse claimant.
The court held that there was, taking into account evidence that the dis-
puted tract was used and occupied for thirty or forty years by the adverse
claimant and his predecessors, that the disputed tract was separated from
adjacent land of the record owner by a fence rebuilt and maintained by
the adverse claimant, and that the general reputation in the community
was that the adverse claimant owned the disputed tract.66 The Butler
opinion contains no mention whatever of good faith or honest mistake,
and it is not clear that the adverse claimant did, in fact, possess in good
faith. His testimony can certainly be construed to mean that he claimed
all that was inside his fence even though it was "in Section 3," which he
knew he did not own.67 Hence I see no basis for citing Butler as a case
where the adverse claimant's good faith was taken into account by the
court in deciding the case in his favor. I will postpone my discussion of
Reeves v. Metropolitan Trust Co.6" until I take up the relevance of bad
faith possession, because the force of Professor Helmholz's reading of
Reeves is based almost entirely on the juxtaposition of the court's holding
that the adverse claimants acquired title to a tract they honestly believed
they owned with its holding that they did not acquire title to a tract they
admittedly knew they did not own.
65. 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
66. Id. at 945.
67. See 455 S.W.2d at 944-45.
68. See supra note 61.
Number 4] 1177
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B. Bad Faith Possession
In my opinion, the cases cited by Professor Helmholz provide almost
no support for his conclusion that "[w]here the possessor knows that he
is trespassing valid title does not accrue to him simply by the passage of
years"69 because the courts feel "that it is wrong to allow someone who
has acted in bad faith to profit thereby."7 The reasons for my opinion
are stated at length in my Reply and will not be repeated here in any
detail. But I do wish to deal with several issues raised by Professor
Helmholz's Response.
In his original article Professor Helmholz cited a number of cases for
the general proposition that the courts have refused "to reward the bad
faith possessor" by describing his possession "as somehow less than suffi-
cient to acquire title."'" He then went on to say, with respect to the
adverse claimant's conduct, that:
A pejorative description can be fastened onto it [the adverse claimant's pos-
session]. It may be described as "scrambling possession" or "provisional
and contingent" occupancy. It may be called "naked possession" or "mere
occupancy." It can be said to stand no higher than "squatter's rights" ....
The invocation of such terms somehow seems sufficient itself to permit the
judge to deny title to the dishonest possessor.72
In light of this language I was amazed to find Professor Helmholz assert,
in his Response, that in his original article he "used no language" 73 sug-
gesting that he thinks such cases involve "disingenuous" 74 conduct or
"subterfuge" 75 on the part of the courts. I think his words speak for
themselves on this point. I was also surprised that he raised the question:
"Does the evidence show that American judges have been dishonest in
deciding adverse possession cases?"76 I made it very clear in my Reply
that I answer that question in the negative because I think the stated
ratio decidendi in the cases cited by Professor Helmholz is the real ratio
decidendi.
A similar observation can be made with respect to the cases in which,
according to Professor Helmholz, the courts have refused "to allow the
69. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 347.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 342.
72. Id. at 342-43. The cases are cited in nn.47-51.
73. Response, supra note 11, at 96.
74. Id. at 95.
75. Id. at 96.
76. Id. at 95.
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possession of a person who knows that he is trespassing on the land of
another to ripen into title" by characterizing "the knowing trespasser's
possession as permissive, although there is no affirmative evidence of the
record owner's having consented to it."' 7 If one were to accept this state-
ment at face value, Professor Helmholz again attributes to the courts a
disingenuous unwillingness to reveal the true basis of their decisions.
But, as with the cases said to characterize the adverse claimant's posses-
sion is somehow less than sufficient to acquire title by attaching a pejora-
tive description, a careful analysis of the permissive possession cases
shows that, in most of them, express permission was given to the adverse
claimant by the true owner, and that in the other cases it is clear that
tacit permission was given.78 Apparently Professor Helmholz rejected
the idea that the true owner's permission may be actual although tacit. I
think he is clearly wrong on this point, because tacit consent is usually
treated as equivalent to express consent in other areas of the law. More-
over, in two of the cases he cited in his Reply,79 Professor Helmholz ig-
nored the fact that the adverse claimant's possession was found to be
permissive because the adverse claimant was a grantor who retained pos-
session of the land in dispute, and the true owner was the grantee of the
land. As Professor Helmholz recognized in his original article, it is well-
settled that a grantor's retained possession is deemed to be permissive
rather than adverse vis-a-vis his grantee.8" And in two of the cases cited
by Professor Helmholz8t there were alternative grounds for the decision:
(1) that the adverse claimant never had actual possession of the land in
dispute; and (2) that if he had possession, it was permissive.
A word should also be said about the cases Professor Helmholz cited
in his original article to support his assertion that the courts regularly
hold that evidence showing the possessor knew enough of the true state
of the title to offer money to the record owner is fatal to the possessor's
claim. 2 As I pointed out in my Reply,8" some of these cases did not
77. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 343.
78. Reply, supra note 10, at 40 nn.149, 150.
79. Id. at 41 n.152.
80. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 351-53.
81. Courtney v. Boykin, 356 So. 2d 162, 165 (Ala. 1978) ('[r]are and widely separated acts...
constitute mere transitory trespasses"); Runnels v. Whitfield, 593 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) ("the land was not enclosed... and it is well settled that an adverse claimant who relies only
upon cattle grazing as evidence of adverse use must show that the land in dispute was designedly
enclosed"). See also Shishilla v. Edmonson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 187, 377 N.E.2d 1115 (1978) (adverse
claimant never had "exclusive" possession of disputed strip).
82. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 345-46.
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involve an offer to pay money, and some involved an actual money pay-
ment or a genuine offer to buy land and/or some other acknowledgement
of the true owner's superior title. In other cases the adverse claimant's
possession was clearly rightful because the true owner either gave express
permission or was a co-tenant who was never excluded by the adverse
claimant.14 In the only case cited by Professor Helmholz as holding that
a mere offer to compromise a disputed claim will prevent acquisition of
title by adverse possession, the adverse claimant actually paid rent to the
true owner." None of the cited cases really supports Professor Helm-
holz's assertion that any offer to pay money to the true owner is fatal to
the adverse claimant's case.
Most of the cases cited by Professor Helmholz to support his assertion
that proof of bad faith has usually been held to be fatal to a claim of title
by adverse possession without judicial resort to any special characteriza-
tion of the claimant's possession 6 do not, in fact, support his assertion,
but simply hold against the adverse claimant either on the ground that he
failed to prove one or more of the positive elements of adverse possession
other than claim of right, or on the ground that he failed to prove a claim
of right because his possession was permissive or because the claimant in
some way acknowledged the true owner's superior title. 7 In none of
these cases did the courts need to discuss the possible relevance of bad
faith, and in none of these cases did the courts characterize the adverse
claimant as having acted in bad faith. In all these cases, I think the
courts meant what they said rather than what Professor Helmholz reads
into their opinions.
Special attention should be directed to two of the cases cited by Profes-
sor Helmholz in support of his conclusion that proof of the adverse
claimant's bad faith is fatal to his case because it shows he had no claim
of right. These cases are Barnes v. Milligan 8 8 and Reeves v. Metropolitan
83. Reply, supra note 10, at 41-44.
84. See cases cited, id. at 41-43 nn.159-65.
85. Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1969) ($200 payment constituted
rent at the rate of $50 per month).
86. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 344-45.
87. See Reply, supra note 10, at 34-36. Hoppe v. Sauter, 416 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
is miscited, as Professor Helmholz admits in his Response, supra note 11, at 87 n.93. Hoppe actually
held that title by adverse possession was acquired by a claimant who admitted he did not own the
land but asserted that he "was claiming it by limitation." Baker v. Benedict, 92 N.M. 283, 587 P.2d
430 (1978), is also miscited, because it was decided under a statute expressly requiring both color of
title and good faith.
88. 200 Neb. 450, 264 N.W.2d 186 (1978).
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Trust Co. 89
Barnes v. Milligan90 was cited in Professor Helmholz's original arti-
cle9" for the proposition that "a clear majority of recent cases" refuse to
find adverse possession "where knowing trespass on the part of the pos-
sessor has been shown." But a careful reading of Barnes reveals that the
adverse claimant failed to establish title by adverse possession, not be-
cause he lacked a claim of right or because he acted in bad faith, but
because he could satisfy the statutory limitation period only by tacking
his own possession to that of his predecessors, who were found to have
lacked a claim of right because they had repeatedly acknowledged the
title of the true owner.92 Nothing in the "Barnes" opinion suggests that
the adverse claimant's possession after he received a quitclaim deed from
his predecessor and took possession of the disputed tract was not under
claim of right, despite the fact that he clearly took possession with
knowledge that his grantor was not the owner.93
Reeves v. Metropolitan Trust Co.94 is rather similar to Barnes v. Milli-
gan, although Reeves did not involve a tacking problem. Reeves involved
two adjoining parcels of land.95 The court held that the adverse claimant
had acquired title by adverse possession to the first parcel but not to the
second. Although the court characterized the claimant's possession of
89. 254 Ark. 1002, 498 S.W.2d 2 (1973).
90. Supra note 88.
91. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 345 n.62. See also Response, supra note 11, at 92.
92. See 200 Neb. at 453, 457-59, 264 N.W.2d at 189, 191-92, where the court explained that (1)
a fence marking the extent of asserted adverse possessions "was placed where it was merely as a
matter of convenience" by the cliamant's predecessors; (2) when the fence was built, the then occu-
pant of the disputed tract declared that "he could pay 'the old lady' [the true owner] ... rent just like
anybody else;" (3) "in at least one earlier instance" unsolicited rent was paid to the owner of another
tract also included within the fence; and (4) before the then occupants of the land signed a contract
to sell adjoining land they owned to the adverse claimant, "they expressly disclaimed ownership,
including any claim of title by adverse possession," of the disputed tract.
93. Indeed, the Barnes opinion suggests that he might have acquired title, despite his lack of
good faith, had he possessed the land for the full statutory period. See 200 Neb. at 457, 264 N.W.2d
at 191 ("The evidence in this case would permit the trial court to find that the possession of the...
by the Stansbie and Engel Company, its successor.... and its grantees until the time of occupation by
Milligan was not hostile.") (Emphasis added.) Clearly the court thought Milligan's possession was
"hostile," noting that Milligan apparently insisted on getting a quitclaim deed to the land in dispute
"to lay a clear ground for a claim of adverse possession." See 200 Neb. at 459, 264 N.W.2d at 192.
94. Supra note 89.
95. This is Professor Helmholz's characterization. See Helmholz, supra note 1, at 338. The
adverse claim actually covered a single tract adjacent to land owned by the claimants, but the court
dealt separately with a part of the tract enclosed by a hedge planted by the claimants ("parcel 1")
and a part of the tract lying outside the hedge ("parcel 2").
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the first parcel as "in good faith,"'9 6 its attention was directed to the is-
sues presented on appeal-whether the claimant's possession should be
deemed permissive and whether it was sufficiently open and notorious.
97
Only the juxtaposition of the words good faith and the court's statement
that the claimant "admits candidly that he knew the [second price] did
not belong to him"98 suggest the explanation advanced by Professor
Helmholz: "The distinction in treatment of the two parcels.., depended
on the existence of an honest mistake about the first parcel, as against a
knowing trespass on the second."9 9 But this is too simplistic a reading of
Reeves. I think the key to the second holding is the court's statement
that the adverse claimants "testified that they did not mean to claim any
land that they did not own."'10 This statement was omitted from the
quotation from Reeves included in Professor Helmholz's original article.
My reading of Reeves, in light of this statement, is that the court decided
against the adverse claimants because they did not assert any claim of
right at all, not because they knew they did not own the land. This read-
ing of Reeves is borne out by an inspection of the two cases10' cited by the
court in support of its holding as to the second parcel in Reeves. Neither
of those cases provides any support for Professor Helmholz's assertion
that bad faith was the key to the holding as to the second parcel in
Reeves. 10
2
Because Professor Helmholz did not, in his original article, tell the
reader enough about the Reeves case to permit an informed conclusion
about the grounds for the court's decision, and because he also failed to
96. 254 Ark. at 1003, 498 S.W.2d at 3.
97. Id. at 1003, 498 S.W.2d at 3.
98. Id. at 1003, 498 S.W.2d at 4.
99. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 338.
100. 254 Ark. at 1003, 498 S.W.2d at 4.
101. Conway v. Shuck, 203 Ark. 559, 157 S.W.2d 777 (1942); Shirey v. Whitlow, 80 Ark. 444,
97 S.W.2d 444 (1906).
102. Conway v. Shuck, supra note 101, contains dictum that "a 'squatter' can never gain pre-
scriptive title to land" because "he makes no claim against the true owner and his possession is,
therefore, not adverse," but the court held only that the adverse claimant could not raise the ques-
tion whether the land (an island) was really located in Tennessee. If the land was really located in
Tennessee, a grant from Arkansas to plaintiffs would have been invalid, and the claimant could show
no title from either Arkansas or Tennessee. 203 Ark. at 562, 157 S.W.2d at 778 (quoting Mayor of
Rosyth v. Hooks, 182 Ga. 78, 184 S.E. 724 (1936)).
In Shirey v. Whitlow, supra note 101, the opinion begins by stating the Maine rule requiring a
deliberately wrongful holding to acquire title to land beyond the claimant's paper boundary, but the
rest of the opinion deals with the legal effect of the claimant's "acknowledgement" of the true
owner's superior title either before or after the statutory limitation period has apparently expired.
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mention the two cases relied on by the Reeves court to support its hold-
ing as to the second parcel of land, I termed his characterization of the
case "both inaccurate and misleading" in my Reply. 10 3 I still think my
characterization is accurate." 4
One final point about the relevance of bad faith possession. As I
pointed out in my Reply, Professor Helmholz, in his original article, con-
ceded that in a substantial number of the cases he surveyed the courts
held that an adverse claimant acquired title by adverse possession despite
the fact that he "knew, or should have known, that the land in question
belonged to someone else." 105 In fact, there are many more such cases
than there are cases (among those cited by Professor Helmholz) that
might possibly be deemed to support his views about the relevance of bad
faith. And I am still of the opinion that these "bad faith" cases cannot be
explained by Professor Helmholz's theory that the adverse claimant for
some reason had equities on his side that outweighed his bad faith. 106
C. Objective Standards and Ethical Values
The main thrust of both Professor Helmholz's original article and his
Response is that, in the cases he surveyed, the courts were moved by
ethical concerns that led them to award title by adverse possession to
good faith claimants and not to award title by adverse possession to bad
faith claimants. I do not think the cases surveyed by Professor Helmholz
support this conclusion. When we look at the cases adopting or applying
the Connecticut rule on the effect of mistake in boundary disputes, it is
clear that the courts are not moved by ethical concerns, for the essence of
the Connecticut rule is that wrongful possession will create a cause of
action whether it is based on good faith or bad faith. In most of the cases
in which, according to Professor Helmholz, the courts have refused to
allow bad faith claimants to acquire title by adverse possession, it is clear
103. Reply, supra note 10, at 31.
104. Please note, however, that I did not use the term "egregious" with respect to his characteri-
zation of Reeves, as Professor Helmholz erroneously stated in his Response. See Response, supra note
i1, at 87. However, I do think that Professor Helmholz's reading of Brylinski v. Cooper, 95 N.M.
580, 624 P.2d 522 (1981)-see Helmholz, supra note 1, at 351-is not only inaccurate and mislead-
ing but is "egregiously" so. See Reply, supra note 10, at 48.
105. Helmholz, supra note 1, at 348-49 nn.73-76.
106. Id. at 349. ProfessorHelmholz also sought, in his original article, to explain appellate
decisions in so-called "special situations" that are inconsistent with his conclusions as to the rele-
vance of good faith and bad faith on the ground that favorable decisions in favor of bad faith claim-
ants are a result of counterbalancing equities. In my Reply, I explained why I disagree. See Reply,
supra note 10, at 49-58.
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that the courts are generally not moved by ethical concerns. As Profes-
sor Helmholz conceded in his original article, the courts "admit the pos-
sibility of a truly hostile claimant [i.e., one who deliberately seeks to
acquire title by adverse possession] acquiring valid title."' 7 Thus, for
example, in Hoppe v. Sauter'08 (which Professor Helmholz miscited in
his original article as a case where bad faith was fatal to the adverse
possessor's claim of title by adverse possession) the adverse claimant was
held to have acquired title where he knew that he did not own the dis-
puted tract (comprising about thirty acres) but took possession in order
to acquire title "by limitation."' 9 On the other hand, when it appears
that the adverse claimant (or his predecessor, where tacking is required)
asserted no claim of right at all, the courts have sometimes refused to
allow the bad faith claimants to acquire title, as the court did in Reeves v.
Metropolitan Trust Co. 0 Yet adverse claimants who deliberately seek to
acquire title by adverse possession would seem ethically inferior to those
who candidly admit that they knew the land did not belong to them and
also admit "they did not mean to claim any land and that they did not
own.""' There is certainly no ethical basis to prefer the former to the
latter.
If courts are really moved by ethical concerns in adverse possession
cases, one is certainly entitled to ask why they almost never forthrightly
state those concerns and hold that possession in bad faith is inconsistent
with a claim of right and therefore cannot lead to acquisition of title by
adverse possession. The only explanation offered by Professor Helmholz
is that this would be contrary to hornbook law." 2 But Professor Helm-
holz himself has noted "[t]he rarity with which American courts have
cited the American Law of Property's treatment" of adverse possession
and asserted that the courts "do not conceive that they owe obedience to
the 'pure possession' view of adverse possession.""' 3 The courts, in fact,
seldom cite either a hornbook or a treatise in support of their holdings on
adverse possession. So the failure of the courts to state explicitly that
they are applying an ethical standard that precludes the award of title to
an adverse possessor is inexplicable if, indeed, that is what they are do-
107. See Helmholz, supra note 1, at 347.
108. 416 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
109. Id. at 914.
110. 254 Ark. 1002, 498 S.W.2d 2 (1973).
111. Id. at 1003, 498 S.W.2d at 4.
112. Helmnholz, supra note 1, at 342.
113. Response, supra note 11, at 96.
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ing. But I do not think that is what they are doing. I think they are
doing exactly what they say they are doing-refusing to award title to an
adverse claimant because he failed to satisfy all the "positive require-
ments" for an adverse possession.
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